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DEFINING A FAIR SHARE: THE PROPOSED REVISION TO
FLORIDA'S CORPORATE PROFITS TAX
MIRANDA FRANKS AND WILLIAM MCVEY SMITH
I. INTRODUCTION
A proposal to limit the scope of Florida's corporate profits tax, by
constitutional amendment will be one of the issues presented to the
voters in the November, 1978, general election.' This proposal3 is the
Florida Constitution Revision Commission's response to a recent
Florida Supreme Court opinion, Department of Revenue v. Leader-
ship Housing, Inc.4 In Leadership Housing, the court held that Flor-
ida's 5% tax on the net income of corporations' applies to all appre-
ciation in the value of corporate property acquired prior to, but sold
after, November 2, 1971-the date on which Florida voters ap-
proved a constitutional amendment lifting the state's prohibition on
taxation of corporate income.
1. FLA. STAT. ch. 220 (1977).
2. Twelve proposed revisions relating to finance and taxation will appear on the ballot as
a single question, which reads:
REVISION NO. 7
REVISION OF ARTICLE VII AND ARTICLE X, §12(h)
FINANCE AND TAXATION
Proposing a revision of the Florida Constitution to provide that property owned by
a municipality and held for municipal purposes shall be exempt from taxation; to
extend the personal property tax exemption to all natural persons, and to extend
to widowers the property tax exemption of not less than five hundred dollars; to
provide for ad valorem tax exemptions for leasehold interests created prior to Janu-
ary 1, 1978 in government owned property; to provide that leasehold interests in
government property leased for public purposes in connection with air, water or
ground transportation may be exempt from taxation as provided by law; to permit
adjustments to tax assessments relating to stock in trade and livestock, historic
property and solar energy systems; to permit the revaluation of property every two
years; to authorize the use of tax abatement and increment for redevelopment of
slum and blighted areas; to provide that corporate income tax may not be levied
against the appreciation of property value occurring prior to November 2, 1971; to
permit an annual adjustment to the homestead exemption to maintain a constant
value using 1979 as a base year and providing for replacement of revenues to local
governments; to provide that state bonds may be used to finance water facilities
and may be combined for sale; to provide that revenue bonds may only be issued
for fixed capital outlay projects, to place limitations on revenue bonds and bond
anticipation notes issued by local governments; and to provide that revenue bonds
may be issued for housing and related facilities.
3. Fla. C.R.C., Proposal 140.
4. 343 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1977).
5. FLA. STAT. § 220.11(2) (1977). Net income is defined in FLA. STAT. § 220.12 (1977).
6. 343 So. 2d at 615. The corporate profits tax applies to gains from the "sale, exchange,
or other disposition of property." FLA. STAT. § 220.02(4)(a) (1977). For purposes of this note,
the use of any one of these terms incorporates the others.
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Proposal 140 is an attempt by the commission to negate the effect
of Leadership Housing on sales of corporate property occurring after
November 7, 1978-the date on which the proposal will be submit-
ted to the voters.7 This proposal would, if approved, amend the
Florida Constitution by adding, as a new subsection (c), the follow-
ing language to article VII, section 5:1
No tax upon, or measured by, income shall be levied by this
state, or under its authority, in respect of the unrealized apprecia-
tion in value of any property which occurred prior to November 2,
1971. Absent convincing evidence to the contrary, appreciation in
the value of property shall be considered to have occurred ratably
over its holding period.
[This section] shall take effect on November 7, 1978, and shall
not reduce any tax liability in respect of taxable years ending prior
to such date.'
The difference between the effect of Leadership Housing and the
effect of Proposal 140 may be best understood through the use of a
simple example. Assume Corporation X purchased 100 acres of Flor-
ida real estate 0 on January 2, 1951, for $100,000. Assume it sold the
7. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 235-36 (Jan. 24, 1978) (remarks of B.K. Roberts).
8. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5, presently provides:
SECTION 5. Estate, inheritance and income taxes.-
(a) NATURAL PERSONS. No tax upon estates or inheritances or upon the
income of natural persons who are residents or citizens of the state shall be levied
by the state, or under its authority, in excess of the aggregate of amounts which
may be allowed to be credited upon or deducted from any similar tax levied by the
United States or any state.
(b) OTHERS. No tax upon the income of residents and citizens other than
natural persons shall be levied by the state, or under its authority, in excess of 5%
of net income, as defined by law, or at such greater rate as is authorized by a three-
fifths (3/5) vote of the membership of each house of the legislature or as will provide
for the state the maximum amount which may be allowed to be credited against
income taxes levied by the United States and other states. There shall be exempt
from taxation not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) of the excess of net income
subject to tax over the maximum amount allowed to be credited against income
taxes levied by the United States and other states.
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE. This section shall become effective immediately upon
approval by the electors of Florida.
9. Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. VII, § 5(c) (May 11, 1978). This language was origi-
nally proposed for addition to art. XII, § 7 as a new subsection (c). On March 6, 1978, the
Style and Drafting Committee recommended, and the commission later approved, transfer
of the language, without modification, to art. VII, § 5. Fla. C.R.C., Comm. on Style and
Drafting, Report to the Florida Constitution Revision Commission 75 (Mar. 6, 1978).
10. The Florida corporate profits tax is actually a tax on the privilege of conducting
business in Florida or being a resident or citizen of the state. The tax is measured by net gains
received from the sale, exchange, or other disposition of all corporate property, both real and
personal. FLA. STAT. § 220.11 (1977). In defining "income," the legislature referred merely to
sale, exchange, or other disposition of "property." Id. § 220.02(4)(a).
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same 100 acres on January 2, 1976, for $200,000. Under the
Leadership Housing rationale, the $100,000 gain which Corporation
X "realized"" from the sale would be subject to the 5% corporate
profits tax. The state would then levy a tax of $5,000.12
Under Proposal 140, Corporation X's $100,000 profit would be
prorated over the twenty-five years the corporation held the prop-
erty prior to sale. 3 The gain attributable to any period prior to
November 2, 1971, the date the constitutional ban on corporate
income taxation was lifted, would be excluded from taxation. In the
case of Corporation X, $80,000 (20 years X $4,000 per year) would
be exempt from the corporate profits tax. Only $20,000-the net
profit attributable to post-1971 years-would be taxed. Under Pro-
posal 140, the state would levy a corporate tax of only $1,000 on this
particular sale.
The issue underlying Proposal 140, therefore, is whether the state
should be allowed to reach back prior to the removal of the ban on
corporate income taxation and tax the appreciation in value occur-
ring while the ban was in effect. The questions raised by this pro-
posal are largely ones of equity and popular intent. Thus, it is neces-
sary to examine the relevant constitutional, legislative, and judicial
history which served as the backdrop for the commission's delibe-
rations on the corporate profits tax proposal. This note will analyze
and assess the merits of Proposal 140 in light of the history of the
Florida corporate profits tax and Leadership Housing.
I1. THE FLORIDA CORPORATE PROFITS TAx-AN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
In 1924 vast areas of Florida were uninhabited wilderness. Out-
side capital and new residents were needed for the state to grow and
prosper." The mid-1920's was a boom period for the entire nation.' 5
11. The court used a tree-fruits analogy to illustrate its view of when income is "realized."
Under this analogy, the fruit would be subject to taxation only after being picked from the
tree-income would be realized only when the appreciation in value is severed from the
underlying asset through sale, exchange, or other disposition. 343 So. 2d at 614.
12. For purposes of this example the mechanics of corporate profits taxation have been
overly simplified. FLA. STAT. § 220.12 (1977) requires a determination of the taxpayer's
"adjusted federal income." The term "adjusted federal income" is defined in § 220.13 and
reflects specified additions and subtractions from the taxable income computed for federal
income tax purposes. The first $5,000 of a corporate taxpayer's net income is exempt from
the state corporate profits tax. Id. § 220.14.
13. The proposal does not specify whether a daily, monthly, or yearly proration formula
is to be used.
14. A 1923 editorial noted: "Capital is Florida's greatest need. Capital, applied to the
development of natural resources, has made Florida what it is today. This has been largely
outside capital. . . .We must continue to invite and attract this outside capital. Without
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Florida was competing with other areas for the flow of investment
dollars. In an effort to attract new residents and investors, the 1923
Florida Legislature proposed amending the state constitution to
prohibit state income and inheritance taxes.
In the months before the proposed amendment was placed on the
ballot in the November, 1924, general election, business interests,
chambers of commerce, civic groups, and the press campaigned
intensively to ensure passage of the amendment. 7 An insert which
appeared on the front page of the Miami Herald on November 2,
1924, is representative of the views expressed in the state's newspa-
pers of the day. The item stated:
If you wish to extend a cordial invitation to investors to come to
Florida and make this state their permanent home, vote "YES" on
the proposition to prevent the legislature from ever imposing taxes
on inheritances and incomes.
A vote in favor of the amendment insures that your own income
will not be taxed in this state and that a very large number of
wealthy people will be induced to come to Florida where they will
become heavy investors and large taxpayers, thus lightening your
own tax burdens and, what is more, contribute to the more rapid
development of the whole state.'"
On November 4, 1924, Florida voters overwhelmingly 9 approved
the amendment to the state constitution prohibiting the Florida
Legislature from levying any "tax. . . upon the income of residents
or citizens of this State . -. ."20
The absolute constitutional prohibition of a state income tax re-
mained unchanged until 1968, when Florida voters approved the
present constitution. 2' The 1968 revision transferred the income and
it, our growth will be halted and our future hazarded." Tampa Morning Tribune, Apr. 13,
1923, § A, at 6, col. 2.
15. See generally R. HOFSTADTER, W. MILLER, & D. AARON, 2 THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 395
(2d ed. 1970).
16. Fla. SJR 135 (1923), 1923 Fla. Laws 483.
17. See, e.g., Fla. Times-Union, Nov. 2, 1924, at 4, col. 1; St. Petersburg Times, Nov. 4,
1924, at 1, col. 4; Tampa Morning Tribune, Nov. 3, 1924, § A, at 1, col. 6.
18. Miami Herald, Nov. 2, 1924, § A, at 1, col. 2.
19. On the day following the referendum, the Miami Herald estimated that Florida voters
approved the amendment by a five to one ratio. Miami Herald, Nov. 5, 1924, § A, at 2, col.
5. The Florida Times-Union estimated that the amendment carried by a six to one margin.
Fla. Times-Union, Nov. 5, 1924, at 12, col. 3. The official count was 60,640 votes for the
amendment, 14,386 against. General election voting records, Nov. 4, 1924 (on file with Fla.
Dep't of State, Div. of Elections, Tallahassee, Fla.)
20. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. IX, § 11 (1924).
21. Voters approved the 1968 revision to the Florida Constitution on November 5, 1968.
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inheritance tax provisions from article IX, section 11, to article VII,
section 5. In addition, the revision modified the absolute prohibition
on income taxation by expanding a contingency provision applica-
ble only to inheritance taxes since 1930. In 1930, a constitutional
amendment had deleted the earlier absolute prohibition of inheri-
tance taxes and merely prohibited the state from levying an inheri-
tance tax in excess of the aggregate amount that Congress may allow
to be credited against or deducted from any similar federal tax.1
As approved by the voters in 1968, the new article VII, section 5,
read:
No tax upon estates or inheritances or upon the income of residents
or citizens of the state shall be levied by the state, or under its
authority, in excess of the aggregate of amounts which may be
allowed to be credited upon or deducted from any similar tax
levied by the United States or any state.Y
The 1968 changes appear to have been presented to the public as
"housekeeping" amendments to simplify the language and the ap-
plication of the income and inheritance tax provision." The press
treated the revision very perfunctorily. The proposed change appar-
ently generated no controversy. 5 Since Congress has not amended
22. FLA. CoNST. of 1885, art. IX, § 11 (1930).
23. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (1968, amended 1971).
24. The reporter's official comments accompanying the 1968 revision of article VII, § 5,
state:
This section continues the general prohibition against inheritance and income
taxes which appeared in the 1885 Constitution, as amended ....
• . . There are two principal changes. First, an income tax may now be levied
subject to the same limitations which formerly applied only to estate and inheri-
tances taxes, that is, it may be allowed up to the credit or deduction from other
taxes levied. Second, the maximum limit set on the tax is the aggregate credits or
deductions allowed not only on a similar tax levied by the United States but also
taxes levied by any state.
D'Alemberte, Commentary, in 26A, FLA. STAT. ANN. 106 (West 1970).
25. For example, an editorial in the Florida Times-Union entitled What's in the New
CONSTITUTION (Articles V, VI, VII) contained the following explanation of the proposed
amendment without further comment: "ESTATE AND INCOME TAXES: Continues the
prohibition upon income and inheritance taxes but adds income taxes to estate and inheri-
tance taxes that may be levied if credited upon or deductible from federal income taxes and
taxes of other states." Fla. Times-Union, Oct. 11, 1968, § A, at 6, col. 1.
The voters in the 1968 general election were presented with three revision proposals. The
income tax revision was not presented as a separate question. Rather, it was included in the
Basic Document Proposal, which read:
Proposing a revision of the Constitution of 1885, generally described as the Basic
Document, embracing the subject matter of all of the Constitution except for Arti-
cles V (Judicial Department), VI (Suffrage and Elections), and VIII (Local Govern-
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the Internal Revenue Code to allow a tax credit or a deduction for
income taxes collected by the states, the effect of the pre-1968 total
prohibition on the taxation of income was unchanged by the 1968
constitutional revision.
Largely as a result of the interaction between the constitutional
prohibition on income taxation and the constitutional requirement
of a balanced budget,26 Florida became known as a sales-and-excise-
tax state.27 In years when expenditures were projected to exceed
revenue, the state imposed additional direct consumer and property
taxes as the only means of raising revenue sufficient to fund the cost
of government. Imposition of a corporate income tax was not viewed
as a serious alternative.
When Reubin O'D. Askew launched his campaign for Governor in
1970, Florida was facing a substantial shortfall in projected revenues
for the 1971-72 fiscal year. 8 A news item in mid-January, 1971,
reported that the state would need an additional $250 million to
finance that year's governmental programs.2 In response to what he
viewed as an unfair tax burden on consumers, Askew campaigned
vigorously for a more equitable tax program in which large multi-
state corporations would be required to contribute their fair share
to the state's revenue funds for the privilege of doing business in
Florida. 0 The tax reform issue dominated Askew's first guberna-
torial campaign. Through numerous speeches and press releases,
Askew presented his "Fair Share Plan" to the people. 31 Voters re-
ment). Article V (Judicial Department) to be carried over from the present Consti-
tution in its entirety.
Proposal reprinted in Miami Herald, Oct. 29, 1968, § D, at 7, col. 2.
26. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § l(d). This provision mandates that the legislature provide for
"raising sufficient revenue to defray the expenses of the state for each fiscal period." A similar
provision has been in effect since the first Florida Constitution was adopted in 1838. See FLA.
CONST. of 1838, art. VIII, § 2; FLA. CONST. of 1861, art. VIII, § 2; FLA. CONST. of 1865, art VIII,
§ 2; FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. IX, § 2.
27. See Horwich, Florida Taxation: A State in Chains, 21 U. MiAMI L. Rav. 36, 39 (1966).
28. In a 1971 advisory opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida took judicial notice of the
substantial gap between the requested budget and the available revenue for the 1971-72 fiscal
period. The court commented that the deficit could result in fiscal chaos unless resolved in
an appropriate manner. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 243 So. 2d 573, 576 (Fla.
1971).
29. St. Petersburg Times, Jan. 17, 1971, § B, at 1, col. 1.
30. The emphasis which candidate Askew placed on tax reform is adequately documented
in the press coverage of the 1970 campaign. The following items from the St. Petersburg
Times are representative: Askew: Poor Carry Tax Burden, Not Rich, Industry, Aug. 13, 1970,
§ B, at 3, col. 1; Askew Calls for 'Meaningful' Tax Reform, Aug. 29, 1970, § B, at 12, col. 1;
Tax Loopholes Leak Millions, Askew Charges, Sept. 2, 1970, § B, at 6, col. 1.
31. The major reform proposed in the plan was the enactment of a corporate profits tax.
Johnson, The Fair Share Plan-A Summary of the Corporate Profits Proposal (Sept. 1, 1971)
(unpublished'staff report) (on file with Press Section, Office of the Governor, Tallahassee,
Fla.).
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sponded by electing Askew Governor over the incumbent Governor,
Claude Kirk.
Askew viewed his election as a mandate from the people of Florida
for major tax reform." He set, as his first priority, implementation
of his tax reform proposals.3 3 In his 1971 inaugural address, Askew
announced his decision to request an advisory opinion from the
Florida Supreme Court on the question of whether the constitu-
tional prohibition on the taxation of income protected corporations
from this form of taxation. 4
The court responded to the Governor's request.3 Six of the seven
justices joined in an opinion which interpreted the term "residents
and citizens" in article VII, section 5 of the constitution to apply to
both natural and artificial persons.36 Only Justice Richard Ervin
expressed a contrary point of view .3 Thus, the court concluded that
the constitution did indeed prohibit taxation of corporate income.
The Governor called a special session of the legislature on January
27, 1971, three days after the court rendered its advisory opinion.
In a proclamation to the house and senate on the opening day of the
special session, Askew asked the legislature to approve a proposed
constitutional amendment allowing a tax upon, or measured by,
corporate income." The house and senate had little difficulty agree-
ing on the language of a proposed constitutional amendment to be
submitted to the voters that November. The legislature completed
work on the proposed amendment on February 3, 1971. 31 An inten-
sive nine-month campaign followed, pitting the Governor against
business interests opposed to the amendment. In November, 1971,
Florida voters approved the corporate tax amendment by a two to
one margin. 0
With the way clear for the enactment of a corporate profits tax,
Governor Askew called the legislature into special session on Nov-
ember 29, 1971, for the express purpose of enacting major tax reform
32. Proclamation by Gov. Reubin O'D. Askew to Joint Session of the Legislature (Nov.
29, 1971), reprinted in FLA. H.R. Joua. 1, 7 (Spec. Sess. Nov. 29, 1971).
33. Id.
34. Inaugural Address by Gov. Reubin O'D. Askew at 1-add. 1 (Jan. 5,1971) (on file with
Press Section, Office of the Governor, Tallahassee, Fla.).
35. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 243 So. 2d 573, 576 (Fla. 1971).
36. Id. at 581. Justices joining in the per curiam decision were Chief Justice B.K. Roberts,
Vassar B. Carlton, James Adkins, Jr., Joseph A. Boyd, Jr., David L. McCain, and Hal P.
Dekle.
37. Id. at 581-84.
38. Proclamation by Gov. Reubin O'D. Askew to Joint Session of the Fla. Legislature
(Jan. 27, 1971), reprinted in FIA. H.R. JouR. 2, 4 (Spec. Sess. Jan. 27, 1971).
39. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 103 (Spec. Sess. Feb. 3, 1971).
40. Fla. Times-Union, Nov. 3, 1971, § A, at 1, col. 1.
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legislation." On December 8, both houses of the legislature ap-
proved a conference committee report outlining the new Florida
Income Tax Code.4" The Florida Income Tax Code became effective
January 1, 1972. It imposes what is widely known as the Florida
Corporate Profits Tax.
If the voters approve Constitution Revision Commission Proposal
140 in the November, 1978, election, the corporate profits tax will
be applied more restrictively than it is currently applied. Therefore,
it is necessary to examine the expressed intent of the legislature in
enacting chapter 220, Florida Statutes, as a prelude to discussing
Leadership Housing and the merits of Proposal 140.
III. CHAPTER 220-THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT
During the November 29, 1971, special session, the legislature
compromised on the provisions it wished to include in the Florida
Income Tax Code. One issue upon which the house and senate dis-
agreed was whether the code should offer taxpayers the option of
using a formula to compute gain from the sale of property acquired
prior to January 1, 1972.11 Use of the formula would, in effect, equate
the taxpayer's basis in the property with the fair market value of
the property on December 31, 1971.
The house approved a version of the bill which included this
valuation formula." The senate, however, eliminated the formula in
one of several amendments to the house bill.45 The house, in turn,
41. Proclamation by Gov. Reubin O'D. Askew, supra note 32, at 1.
42. FLA. H.R. JouR. 99 (Spec. Sess. Dec. 8, 1971); FLA. S. Joua. 55 (Spec. Sess. Dec. 8,
1971); see A. England, Jr., Corporate Income Taxation in Florida: Background, Scope, and
Analysis, in AN INTRODUCTION TO FLORIDA CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION 4 (FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
ed. 1972), for a history of the legislative process which resulted in enactment of the Florida
Income Tax Code, FLA. STAT. ch. 220 (1971).
43. The provision in controversy read:
(c) Capital transactions.
(1) At the election of any taxpayer. . . the gain or loss to be taken into account
in the computation of gross income or taxable income for any taxable year with
respect to any capital asset which has been acquired before January 1, 1972 shall
be limited
a. to an amount which shall bear the same ratio to the gain or loss so taken into
account as the number of months (or any fraction thereof) after December 31, 1971
shall bear to the number of months (or any fraction thereof) included in the tax-
payer's holding period for such capital asset as determined under section 1223 of
the Internal Revenue Code, or
b. to the gain or loss which would have been taken into account if the taxpayer's
basis for such capital asset, as determined for federal income tax purposes, had
been the fair market value of the capital asset on December 31, 1971.
Proposed § 2 2 0.13(1)(c), Fla. CS/HB 16-D (1971).
44. FLA. H.R. Joua. 18 (Spec. Sess. Nov. 30, 1971).
45. FLA. S. JouR. 23 (Spec. Sess. Dec. 1, 1971).
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rejected all the senate amendments." A conference committee, ap-
pointed to recommend a compromise position, recommended dele-
tion of the formula. 7 Both houses of the legislature adopted the
conference committee's report."
Although this legislative history indicates that in 1971 the legisla-
ture considered and deleted language which would have exempted
from the corporate profits tax appreciation in property value occur-
ring prior to December 31, 1971, the reason for the deletion is un-
clear. In April, 1972-four months after the legislature passed the
Florida Income Tax Code-Arthur J. England, Jr., then Special
Tax Counsel to the Florida House of Representatives, published a
review and analysis of the legislature's deliberations over the corpo-
rate profits tax issue. He wrote:
[A] proposal Was considered to value all property as of December
31, 1971, for the purpose of prohibiting taxation on virtually all
accruals or accretions of value prior to 1972. This proposal was
rejected as being unnecessary to the Florida scheme of taxation,
unduly difficult to administer since all types of property would
have to be valued as of December 31, and undesirable from a
revenue standpoint. °
But comments by 1977-78 constitution revision commissioners
who served as legislators during the 1971 special session are also of
interest. For example, Commissioner Don Reed stated during com-
mission debate on Proposal 140:
I participated in that bloc [which, if it had] withheld its votes
. . . would have essentially killed [the] corporate profit tax.
. . . [N]one of those people, including myself, would have
voted for that tax if [he] had any inkling that . . . a bureaucracy
of the State would attempt to reach back prior to the effective date
for the purpose of determining any kind of valuation on which to
base a tax[.151
46. FLA. H.R. JouR. 52 (Spec. Sess. Dec. 6, 1971).
47. FLA. H.R. JoUa. 96 (Spec. Sess. Dec. 8, 1971); FLA. S. JouR. 53-54 (Spec. Sess. Dec.
8, 1971).
48. FA. H.R. JouR. 99 (Spec. Sess. Dec. 8, 1971); FLA. S. JouR. 55 (Spec. Sess. Dec. 8,
1971).
49. A. England, Jr., supra note 42.
50. Id. at 21.
51. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 225 (Jan. 24, 1978). See also id. at 226 (remarks
of Kenneth Plante and James Kynes).
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Although interesting, the subsequent explanations of persons who
participated in the 1971 enactment of the corporate profits tax are
not determinative on the issue of legislative intent.12 Instead we
must look to the expression of intent approved by the legislature and
incorporated into the Florida Income Tax Code.
Chapter 220 contains a lengthy exposition of legislative intent.
Several of the intent sections are relevant to the discussions of
Leadership Housing and Proposal 140 which follow. In part, section
220.02, Florida Statutes, provides:
(3) It is the intent of the legislature that the income tax im-
posed by this Code shall utilize, to the greatest extent possible,
concepts of law which have been developed in connection with the
income tax laws of the United States .
(4) It is the intent of the legislature that the tax imposed by
this Code shall be prospective in effect only. Consistent with this
intention and the intent expressed in subsection (3), it is hereby
declared to be the intent of the legislature that:
(a) "Income," for purposes of this Code, including gains from
the sale, exchange, or other disposition of property, shall be
deemed to be created for Florida income tax purposes at such time
as said income is realized for federal income tax purposes;
(b) No accretion of value, no accrual of gain, and no acquisi-
tion of a right to receive or accrue income which has occurred or
been generated prior to November 2, 1971, shall be deemed to be
"property," or an interest in property, for any purpose under this
Code; and
(c) All income realized for federal income tax purposes after
November 2, 1971, shall be subject to taxation in full by this state
and shall be taxed in the manner and to the extent provided in this
Code."
In analyzing these statements of legislative intent, it is evident
that one means of deriving "income" is to sell, exchange, or other-
wise dispose of property. And yet the legislature expressly provided
that no appreciation in value which occurred prior to November 2,
1971, may be deemed to be "property" or an interest in property for
any purpose under the Florida Income Tax Code. Thus, when the
statutory definition of "income" is considered in conjunction with
the caveat regarding property values which accrued prior to Novem-
52. See Gulf Power Co. v. Bevis, 296 So. 2d 482, 486 (Fla. 1974); Security Feed & Seed
Co. v. Lee, 189 So. 869, 870 (Fla. 1939). See also 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION. § 48.16, at 222 (1973).
53. FLA. STAT. § 220.02 (1977).
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ber 2, 1971, it appears arguable at least that only the amount of gain
attributable to post-November 2, 1971, appreciation was intended
to be subject to taxation. This argument is supported by the statu-
tory construction rule that specific provisions control more general
provisions." Here, the term "property" is used in the section defin-
ing realization of income. The statute then immediately defines
"property," for purposes of the Florida Income Tax Code, to exclude
accruals of gain generated prior to November 2, 1971. Therefore,
although income may have been realized for federal tax purposes,
the more specific provision defining property indicates that such
realization does not generate income within the meaning of the
Florida statute.
But the legislature included additional language which creates an
ambiguity and makes an accurate interpretation of legislative in-
tent difficult, if not impossible. 5 Section 220.02(4)(c) incorporates
federal tax law concepts and provides that all income realized for
federal tax purposes after November 2, 1971, shall be fully subject
to taxation by the state."
All that seems clear after careful consideration of the expressions
of legislative intent is that the intent section of the Florida Income
Tax Code provides more questions than answers. It is uncertain
from the language of section 220.02 whether the legislature intended
the corporate profits tax to apply only to appreciation in value
accruing after November 2, 1971, or whether the legislature in-
tended to tax all gain derived from a post-November 2, 1971, sale,
exchange, or other disposition of corporate property, regardless of
when the appreciation in value accrued.
It is not surprising that even the participants in the 1971 tax
54. See 2A C. SANs, supra note 52, § 47.19, at 112. This rule of statutory construction
has been applied to tax statutes, including the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., Bulova
Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 (1961).
55. Assistant Attorney General Daniel C. Brown expressed a different view in a memoran-
dum distributed to the commission's Finance and Taxation Committee members. He wrote:
The purpose for including Section 220.02, Florida Statutes, in the Income Tax
Code is clear. The language of that section makes it clear that the tax imposed by
Chapter 220 is in no way a tax upon the accrued value of property, but is rather a
tax upon the income derived from the sale of property. Thus the clear intention of
the legislature was to include all accretions to value, whether occuring [sic] before
or after November 2, 1971, in the income taxable as capital gains, if such accretions
to value were realized as income by sale of the property subsequent to November
2, 1971.
Brown, Considerations in Regard to Proposal to Exclude Income Tax on Capital Gains Ac-
crued but not Realized Prior to November 2, 1971 by Constitutional Prohibition 2-3 (Oct. 24,
1977) (memorandum presented to Fla. C.R.C. Finance and Taxation Committee) (on file with
Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
56. FLA. STAT. § 220.02(4)(c) (1977).
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reform special session have differing recollections of what the legis-
lature intended. Therefore, perhaps it also is not surprising that
neither the court in Leadership Housing nor the proponents of
Proposal 140 in presentations to the commission found it necessary
to rely on the murky expression of legislative intent contained in
chapter 220 for their respective interpretations of the scope of the
corporate profits tax. As will be discussed in the following sections
of this note, the court chose to focus on the expediency and consist-
ency offered by the federal definition of "income." In contrast, the
advocates of Proposal 140 relied on what they presumed to be the
intent of the voters who adopted the 1924 constitutional prohibition
of income taxation.
IV. Leadership Housing-THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF
CHAPTER 220
Department of Revenue v. Leadership Housing, Inc. 7 provided
the impetus that eventually resulted in Proposal 140. In that case,
two corporations maintained they owed taxes on only a portion of
the gain received when they sold property in 1972 and 1973. The
Department of Revenue sought to tax the full amount of the gain.
The corporations, Leadership Housing, Inc. and Leadership Com-
munities, Inc.,5" had purchased the property between 1924 and 1971.
The taxpayers' position was that no corporate income tax could be
imposed on appreciation occurring prior to removal of the constitu-
tional ban on taxation of corporate income on November 2, 1971.19
The Florida Department of Revenue maintained that the entire
gain realized was subject to the tax, including appreciation that had
accrued prior to the date on which the voters approved the constitu-
tional amendment permitting the tax.6 Facing similar problems
with other property purchased prior to 1971,1 the corporations filed
an action in Broward County Circuit Court seeking an interpreta-
tion of the statute. 2
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the taxpay-
ers on the grounds that the constitutional prohibition of an income
57. 343 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1977).
58. Leadership Housing, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
in Broward County, Florida. Leadership Communities, Inc. is a Florida corporation with its
principal place of business in Broward County, Florida.
59. Brief of Appellees at 11, Department of Revenue v. Leadership Hous., Inc., 343 So.
2d 611.
60. Brief of Appellant at app. 2-3, Department of Revenue v. Leadership Hous., Inc., 343
So. 2d 611.
61. Id. at 3.
62. Brief of Appellant, supra note 60, at 1.
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tax prohibited taxing increases in the value of property occurring
prior to November 2, 1971, regardless of the date the increases were
realized by sale or exchange. 3 The court concluded that the 1924
constitutional prohibition prevented the 1971 legislature from pass-
ing a retroactive taxing statute. According to the court, the statute's
retroactive operation constituted an impairment, without due pro-
cess of law, of rights constitutionally vested, thereby violating the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution as well as
article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution. The court held that
the tax could be imposed only upon appreciation occurring after
November 2, 1971, and allowed the taxpayers to deduct from the
gain realized on the sale of the property an amount equal to the fair
market value of the property on that date. 6
On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court,6 5 the Department of
Revenue argued that the time of actual appreciation was irrelevant
and that the tax was not retroactive because it was not imposed
until income was realized. The department also argued that, since
no tax is imposed until a gain is realized, the taxpayer controls his
own tax liability. 7 Relying on a 1919 United States Supreme Court
case, Eisner v. Macomber," the department maintained that a "sale
or exchange at a gain is the event upon which the incidence of tax
is made to depend. 619
In contrast, the taxpayers asserted that the constitutional prohi-
bition of income taxation, in effect between 1924 and 1971, was
intended to apply to "income" in the broadest sense of the term. 70
They conceded that construction of the term "income" to include
appreciation in value would permit the legislature to tax such ap-
preciation as it accrues but assumed the legislature would refrain
from doing so. 71 The taxpayers asked that property acquired prior
to 1971 be given a basis equal to the fair market value at the time
the constitutional prohibition of income taxation was removed. 72
Since gain realized is computed by taking the excess of the price
received from a sale or other disposition of property over the tax-
63. 343 So. 2d at 613.
64. Id.
65. FLA. CONST. art V, § 3(b)(1) authorizes direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court
from any trial court decision initially and directly passing on the validity of a statute.
66. Brief of Appellant, supra note 60, at 12, 23.
67. Id. at 13. According to the appellant, a taxpayer may choose either to incur tax
liability by completing a sale or to avoid taxation by retaining ownership of the property.
68. 252 U.S. 189 (1919).
69. Brief of Appellant, supra note 60, at 14.
70. Brief of Appellees, supra note 59, at 11, 17-27.
71. See 343 So. 2d at 613.
72. Id. at 614.
19781 1041
1042 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:1029
payer's basis in the property,73 this adjustment in basis would pro-
vide a method of taxing only the appreciation occurring between
1971 and the date of sale.
In reversing the trial court, the Florida Supreme Court based its
decision solely "on the meaning of income with respect to capital
appreciation." The court upheld the constitutionality of the stat-
ute and held that "appreciation in value of a capital asset is not
income until it is realized from a sale, exchange or other disposition
of the asset . . . . 'I Thus, since the taxpayers received no
"income" during the time that the constitutional prohibition was in
effect, there was nothing improper about taxing the entire amount
of appreciation after it was converted into "income" at the time of
sale.
The court began by acknowledging that various scholars have
disagreed as to whether capital appreciation is income to the owner
of the property as the appreciation accrues and as to whether the
appreciation may be taxed as it accrues without violating any fed-
eral constitutional prohibitions." The court refused to hold that
appreciation constitutes income as the appreciation accrues, stating
that such a holding could create tax liability for many taxpayers.77
The court chose not to elaborate on how such a liability might occur.
Presumably, however, such a holding would impose no liability un-
less and until the legislature decided to levy a tax on the apprecia-
tion, without regard to whether the income was realized.
The court next discussed the taxpayers' claim that bases in as-
sets acquired prior to 1971 should be readjusted to reflect value in
1971. Again the court said that such a holding would impose a
liability on many taxpayers. "The practical effect of the judicial
decision asked for by the appellees," the court noted, "could require
a downward valuation of assets which had depreciated, imposing
greater tax liability on some taxpayers. 18 Justice Overton, for the
majority, explained that the basis adjustment asked for by the tax-
73. See generally I.R.C. § 1001.
74. 343 So. 2d at 614.
75. Id. at 612.
76. Id. at 613-14. The court cited for comparison: Lowndes, Current Conceptions of Taxa-
ble Income, 25 OtHo ST. L.J. 151 (1964); Mullock, The ConstitutionalAspects of Realization,
31 U. Prrrs. L. REV. 615 (1970).
77. 343 So. 2d at 614.
78. Id. This effect can be illustrated by the following example: Assume that taxpayer A
purchased an asset in 1924 for $100. Assume that by 1970 the asset had depreciated in value
to $50 and was finally sold at that price in 1975. The taxpayer's basis in the property would
be adjusted from $100 to $50-the fair market value of the asset in 1971. Thus, although A
would have suffered a $50 economic loss, he would receive no deduction for the loss because
his basis and amount realized would be equal. See I.R.C. § 1001.
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payers was unlike those allowed under some federal tax sections
which adjust the basis to the greater of cost or fair market value.79
This construction would eliminate the problem that the court
thought would be created by a strict fair market value adjustment.
But in holding the statute constitutional, the court was not required
to determine the basis issue. As the rationale for its holding, the
court accepted the appellant's position that capital appreciation is
not "income" until it is severed from the capital asset and the
taxpayer enjoys some economic benefit. 0
Distinguishing various United States Supreme Court cases that
have expanded the meaning of sale or exchange, thereby expanding
the meaning of income realization, the court stated that "[n]o
assertion is made in these cases that appreciation in and of itself is
taxable.""' This statement typifies the fundamental misconception
in the court's analysis, namely, that the term "income" within the
meaning of the Florida constitutional prohibition and the term
"income" with respect to realization and imposition of the tax must
necessarily have identical definitions.
The fundamental issue in the case should have been whether the
term "income" in the constitutional prohibition included capital
appreciation, not whether capital appreciation constitutes income
generally. Had the court narrowed its analysis to this issue, it could
have avoided entirely the issue of whether capital appreciation may
constitutionally be taxed and also could have avoided entirely the
doctrine of realization.2 If the constitutional prohibition was meant
79. 343 So. 2d at 614.
80. Id. The court expressly approved the definition of "income" developed in Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1919).
81. 343 So. 2d at 614.
82. It is interesting to note that the court's "realization" analysis appears to have lead to
some confusion in a recent Florida Supreme Court case involving capital gains for which
recognition was deferred pursuant to I.R.C. § 1033. In S.R.G. Corp. v. Florida Dep't of
Revenue, No. 52,491 (Fla. June 30, 1978), 27 FLA. L.W. 326 (Fla. July 7, 1978), the taxpayer
received a condemnation award in 1963 but elected to defer recognition of the gain realized
by reinvesting the amount received in similar property in 1965, pursuant to I.R.C. § 1033.
The taxpayer's basis in the new property was equal to his basis in the old property, as
provided by § 1033.
When the taxpayer sold the new property in 1975, he paid federal income tax on the entire
gain realized-the excess of the price received over the basis in the old property. I.R.C.
§ 1001. The taxpayer asserted, however, that for purposes of the Florida tax, only that portion
of the gain equal to the excess of the price received from the sale over the amount received
in the condemnation award was subject to taxation. The taxpayer claimed that it had "real-
ized" gain at the time of the condemnation award; thus, the realization of gain occurred at a
time when the constitution prohibited taxation of corporate income.
A majority of the Florida Supreme Court agreed, stating that realization of gain is the event
which brings the gain within the constitutional prohibition, regardless of recognition. Justice
England, who had recused himself from the Leadership Housing decision at the taxpayers'
request because of his involvement in drafting the corporate profits tax legislation, see De-
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to envelop capital appreciation within its protection, then the issue
of when a tax may be imposed on capital appreciation, absent a
state constitutional ban, becomes irrelevant.
Justice B.K. Roberts attempted to make this distinction in his
dissenting opinion. 3 His analysis focused on whether capital appre-
ciation was constitutionally immune from tax during the period in
which the prohibition was in effect. In stating that such apprecia-
tion was immune from tax, Justice Roberts noted that it is immater-
ial that the sale or exchange triggering the imposition of the tax
occurred after 1971.84 In support of his position, he stated that when
the voters approved the constitutional prohibition of income tax-
ation in 1924, they were familiar with the federal income tax law
which imposed "a tax on income 'from all sources,' including 'gains
or profits and income derived from any source whatever.' """ Accord-
ing to Justice Roberts, "[lilt cannot be doubted that, in adopting
the constitutional prohibition against income taxes, the people of
this state intended to prohibit the taxation of increases in capital
assets, as well as other gains and profits, as income.''86 He viewed
taxing gains which accrued during the constitutional ban on income
taxation as a breach of faith:
To break faith with those corporations (and with natural persons,
should the people of this state ever see fit to repeal the income-tax
prohibition altogether) who invested their capital in this state in
reliance on that constitutional covenant would unquestionably be
morally wrong and, in our opinion, legally impermissible as viola-
tive of the manifest purpose and intent of the 1924 income-tax
prohibition and the constitutional rights therein guaranteed."7
Only Justice Adkins concurred in the dissent.
Dissatisfied with the court's decision, the taxpayers decided to
present the issue to the Florida Constitution Revision Commission.
partment of Revenue v. Leadership Hous., Inc., 322 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1975), wrote a dissenting
opinion more appropriate to the court's reasoning in Leadership Housing. Justice Sundberg
joined in this dissent, which emphasized the basis adjustment involved in deferring recogni-
tion of gain. Since the basis in the new property was identical to that of the old, the gain
realized upon sale of the new property included the deferred gain as well as the subsequent
appreciation. Therefore, the dissent stated, since the deferred gain and subsequent apprecia-
tion were both realized at a time when there was no longer a constitutional prohibition on
taxation, the entire gain should be subject to the Florida corporate profits tax. No. 52,491,
slip op. at 13-14.
83. 343 So. 2d at 616 (Roberts, J. [retired], dissenting).
84. Id. at 616-17.
85. Id. at 618 (quoting a 1913 federal income tax law).
86. Id. at 618.
87. Id.
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The next section of this note traces the history of Proposal 140 before
the commission.
V. PROPOSAL 140-THE COMMISSION'S RESPONSE
Proponents of a constitutional amendment to limit the reach of
Florida's corporate profits tax first presented their views to the Flor-
ida Constitution Revision Commission in public hearings held on
February 21-23, 1978. The commission heard testimony both for and
against an amendment to limit the scope of Florida's corporate
profits tax constitutionally."' On September 28, 1977, commission-
ers voted to include the corporate profits tax issue in the list of
suggestions from the public that would receive further considera-
tion. 9 The issue was formally introduced as "Proposal 140."
The Finance and Taxation Committee considered Proposal 140 on
November 14, 1978.90 Representatives of Associated Industries of
Florida, an influential lobbying group for business interests, pre-
sented arguments in favor of the proposal.9 One speaker, Martha
Barnett, 2 traced for committee members the constitutional, legisla-
tive, and judicial history which prompted the introduction of Pro-
posal 140. Her arguments in favor of the proposal, in large part,
focused on the equitable considerations involved. She stated:
In 1924, the people limited the power of the Legislature by pro-
hibiting an income tax. That limitation remained in effect for 47
years, until 1971, when the people through a constitutional amend-
ment, partially lifted it as it applied to corporate income. To now
say that the Legislature can "look back" and capture the income
it constitutionally could not touch, is a violation of our basic con-
cept- of fair play and due process. 3
Barnett argued that the voters in 1924 viewed "income" in the
88. University of Florida Center for Governmental Responsibility, Public Testimony Be-
fore the Florida Constitution Revision Commission, Summaries of Points Raised at Hearings
February 21, 22, and 23, 1978, at 41 (Mar. 2, 1978) (part of official C.R.C. record on file with
Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
89. Fla. C.R.C., Constitution Revision Commission Issue List (List of 232) 16 (Sept. 28,
1977).
90. Members of the Finance and Taxation Committee were: Commissioners Plante
(chairman), Burkholz, Ausley, Platt, N. Reed, Thayer, Ware, Gardner, and DeGrove.
91. Fla. C.R.C., Finance and Taxation Committee, tape recording of proceedings (Nov.
14, 1977) (on file with Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
92. Attorney representing Consolidated-Tomoka Land Company.
93. M. Barnett, Remarks Given by Martha W. Barnett on Behalf of Consolidated-
Tomoka Land Company Before the Fla. C.R.C. Finance and Tax Committee 5 (Nov. 14,
1977) (on file with Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter cited
as Excerpts of Remarks by Martha Barnett].
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broadest sense of the term and that they intended to prohibit tax-
ation of increases in value as well as gains and profits realized? 4 No
one presented formal statements in opposition to the proposal.
Committee members questioned the speakers on the proposal's fis-
cal impact" and queried whether the issue might more appropri-
ately be a legislative rather than a constitutional matter." Appar-
ently persuaded by the proponents' arguments, the committee en-
dorsed the proposal by a vote of five to one and sent it to the
commission for debate.' 7
Commissioner Kenneth Plante was the chief proponent of Pro-
posal 140 during floor debate. His arguments highlighted the same
equitable considerations raised before the Finance and Taxation
Committee and in Justice Roberts' Leadership Housing dissent."
Commissioner Plante stated: "I think . . . that the legislature has
broken faith . . . with the people of the State of Florida."99
94. Id. at 7.
95. The fiscal impact which Proposal 140 will have if approved by the voters cannot be
accurately determined. See Letter from Harry L. Coe, Jr., Executive Director, Fla. Dep't of
Revenue, to Talbot D'Alemberte, Chairman, Fla. C.R.C., with attached staff report by Dep't
of Revenue on fiscal impact of Proposal 140 (Dec. 21, 1977) (on file with Fla. Dep't of State,
Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). The attachment regarding Proposal 140 states:
In order to determine the fiscal impact of this proposal, the following factors
would be necessary:
1. Cost basis of all property held by corporate taxpayers which was ac-
quired prior to November 2, 1971.
2. Date of acquisition for each piece of property acquired prior to November
2, 1971.
3. Date of sale or other disposition of property which was acquired prior to
November 2, 1971, and disposed of after November 7, 1978.
4. Dollar amount of all sales or other dispositions of property acquired prior
to November 2, 1971, and sold after November 7, 1978.
The attachment to Coe's letter also contains the following information on the potential
fiscal impact of Proposal 140:
During the period of time the Leadership Housing case was in litigation . . . the
Department denied 412 claims for refund totaling $15,673,285 and made approxi-
mately twenty assessments for additional tax totaling $2,870,008. All of these
claims and refund denials represent the tax . ..on the appreciation of property
prior to November 2, 1971. This represents approximately 1/2 of one percent of the
number of corporate income tax filers, and gives some indication of probable conse-
quences.
96. Commissioner Jan Platt, the only committee member to vote against Proposal 140,
indicated that she did so because, in her view, the matter more properly belonged with the
legislature. Fla. C.R.C., Finance and Taxation Committee, tape recording of proceedings
(Nov. 14, 1977) (on file with Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
97. Committee members voting for the proposal were Burkholz, N. Reed, Thayer, Ware,
and Gardner. Commissioner DeGrove did not attend the meeting.
98. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 213-51 (Jan. 24, 1978) (remarks of Kenneth
Plante).
99. Id. at 221.
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B.K. Roberts, in his role as a member of the commission, reiter-
ated many of the points he made in his Leadership Housing dissent.
He argued that a constructive fraud had been perpetrated on the
people who were induced to invest and settle in Florida as a result
of the 1924 constitutional ban on income taxation. 00
Speaking in opposition to the proposal, Commissioner Overton,
author of the majority opinion in Leadership Housing, pointed out
that in 1971 the legislature had rejected the proposal the commis-
sion was considering. "It can be presented to the legislature again,"
Overton said. "It . . . should not be a subject for concern of [this
Commission] ."'101
Commission Chairman Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte also spoke
in opposition. He said that the legislature has the staff and facilities
to determine more accurately the implications of the proposal.10°
The chairman also addressed the breach of faith issue. He stressed
that prior to 1971 the constitution did not refer to persons or corpo-
rations. It referred only to citizens and residents. According to
D'Alemberte, who was a member of the legislature when the corpo-
rate tax was enacted, "there was considerable doubt until 1971 as
to whether or not there was any constitutional prohibition against
taxation of corporate property . . . . There was no Constitution
°holding out to corporations there would be no taxation. We didn't
know what the law was until 1971 .... 11113 Implicit in his remarks
was the argument that, since there was no assurance that the in-
come tax prohibition applied to corporations, there had been no
breach of faith.
Ultimately, the commission approved Proposal 140 by a vote of
twenty to eleven.1°4
Before completing its work, the commission decided not to submit
Proposal 140 and the other finance and taxation issues to the voters
as separate items on the November ballot. Instead, the commission
incorporated all finance and taxation issues in a single proposal for
presentation to the voters. 0 5 Included in this proposal are several
100. Id. at 233.
101. Id. at 230.
102. Id. at 246.
103. Id. at 248.
104. Id. at 251 (announcement of vote on final passage). Commissioners voting for Pro-
posal 140 were: Annis, Ausley, Barron, Birchfield, Brantley, Gardner, Hollis, James, Kynes,
J. Moore, R. Moore, Oliva, Plante, Polak, D. Reed, Roberts, Ryals, Spence, Thayer, and
Ware. Commissioners voting against the proposal were: Apthorpe, Collins, DeGrove, Doug-
lass, Groomes, Harrison, Moyle, Overton, Platt, Shevin, and the chairman. Commissioners
for whom no vote was recorded were: Barkdull, Burkholz, Clark, McCrary, Mathews, and N.
Reed.
105. See note 2 supra for text of the finance and taxation proposal that will be placed on
104719781
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proposed revisions which, if approved, would directly or indirectly
benefit Florida's businesses and industries. Also included is a pro-
posal which would tie the state's homestead exemption to an infla-
tion index.10
Governor Askew has publicly criticized the commission for link-
ing the homestead exemption issue-which will doubtless be popu-
lar with homeowners-to the proposals offering substantial tax
breaks to industry.' 7 In a prepared statement to the press, Askew
referred to the tax breaks as "nothing more than unjustified, multi-
million dollar gifts to the special interests of this state which serve
only to increase the taxes on the people."'08 He asked, "Is there any
doubt . . . that the overriding strategy of these special interests
• . .was to tie their proposal for tax breaks with the homestead
exemption proposal knowing their tax breaks standing alone will
have very little appeal to the people?"''
VI. PROPOSAL 140-ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT
Proposal 140 would allow corporations to prorate any gain realized
on the sale of property acquired before November 2, 1971, between
the years prior to and after that date. Only that portion of the gain
attributable to the period following November 2, 1971, would be
taxable. ' 0 The proposal would create a rebuttable presumption that'
appreciation in the value of property occurred ratably over its hold-
ing period."'
If enacted by the voters, Proposal 140 would take effect on Nov-
ember 7, 1978. It would not operate retroactively. That is, corpora-
tions such as Leadership Housing, Inc. which sold property in the
period between the January 1, 1972, effective date of the corporate
the ballot. See also Note, Ad Valorem Taxation of Leasehold Interests in Governmentally
Owned Property, infra this issue.
106. See Note, The False Promise of Homeowner Tax Relief, infra this issue.
107. R. Askew, news release (May 5, 1978) (on file with Press Section, Office of the
Governor, Tallahassee, Fla.).
108. Id. at add. 1.
109. Id. at 1.
110. Although the effective date of the Florida Income Tax Code is January 1, 1972,
appreciation in value attributable to the period between November 2, 1971, and January 1,
1972, would be subject to taxation when gain is realized from a post-January 1, 1972, sale
since no constitutional prohibition of taxation of corporate income was effective after Novem-
ber 2, 1971.
111. The proposal states: "Absent convincing evidence to the contrary, appreciation in
the value of property shall be considered to have occurred ratably over its holding period."
Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. VII, § 5(c) (May 11, 1978). Presumably, more than a
preponderance of the evidence would be required to rebut the presumption of ratable
appreciation.
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profits tax, and November 7, 1978, would have to pay tax on the
entire gain from the sale. No rebates are intended."2
It is difficult to determine what impact Proposal 140 will have on
state revenues. Department of Revenue officials are unable to make
a dollar estimate of the taxes that will be lost if the measure is
enacted. 3 However, assuming that there is some corporate property
in the state with untaxed pre-1972 appreciation, some revenue will
be lost."' This loss will have to be offset-either through increases
in other taxes or by a reduction in state services. In addition, it
seems clear that the proposal would result in a lengthier, more cum-
bersome system of auditing corporate tax returns."' Moreover, the
cost of administering the state's tax system would inevitably in-
crease, thereby compounding the problem of lost revenues. Thus, it
is clear that Proposal 140 would relieve some, and perhaps many,
corporations of a portion of their tax obligation. But the effect of this
relief on state revenues is unknown.
Although it is difficult to measure the economic significance of
Proposal 140, there are strong arguments both for and against the
proposal. On one side of the issue is Governor Askew's professed goal
of making corporations bear their "fair share" of the state's tax
burden. On the other side is the view that a corporation's "fair
share" of taxes does not include taxation of that portion of property
appreciation which accrued while the state constitution banned the
taxation of corporate income.
In essence, the arguments on both sides of the issue reduce to
differing definitions of the term "income." Supporters of Proposal
140 assert that the term includes unrealized appreciation in the
value of property."' They claim that when the voters approved the
constitutional ban on income taxation in 1924, the voters under-
stood the term "income" to include any increase in property value,
whether or not the gain was converted into cash through a sale."'
112. The last paragraph of the proposal reads: "[This section] shall take effect on Nov-
ember 7, 1978, and shall not reduce any tax liability in respect of taxable years ending prior
to such date." Id. at Schedule to Article VII, Section 5. For a discussion of the rebate issue,
see Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 222-24, 231, 236-39 (Jan. 24, 1978).
113. See note 95 supra for information contained in the fiscal impact statement prepared
by the Department of Revenue.
114. Id.
115. For example, the Department of Revenue will have to develop, and taxpayers will
have to comply with, procedures for determining the value of real and personal corporate
property on November 2, 1971.
116. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 216 (Jan. 24, 1978) (remarks of Ben Overton
and Kenneth Plante). See also Excerpts of Remarks by Martha Barnett, supra note 93, at 6.
117. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 231-33 (Jan. 24, 1978) (remarks of B.K. Rob-
erts).
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To support their position, proponents draw various inferences from
items which appeared in the press in the months preceding the 1924
referendum."' For example, Barnett, in her remarks to the Finance
and Taxation Committee, claimed:
The people who voted to exempt income were laymen. They did
not understand, or care, about economic theory or technical tax
accounting concepts. . . . It is reasonable to assume that the peo-
ple viewed income in its broadest sense, in the plain, ordinary,
common usage of an increased economic value, money in their
pockets.
• . . Surely, in adopting the prohibition on income taxes, the
people of the state intended to prohibit taxation of increases in
capital assets, as well as gains and profits, as income."'
Thus, the proponents' major argument is that, since unrealized
appreciation in property value is income, absent express authoriza-
tion in the 1971 constitutional amendment, the legislature was pro-
hibited from enacting a taxing statute allowing the state to reach
back to tax the "income" which accrued to corporate property while
the constitutional prohibition was in effect. Proponents assert that
the legislature is prevented from doing indirectly that which it is
prohibited from doing directly. 20
Backers of the amendment recognize that the definition of income
which they espouse would allow a future legislature to tax the un-
realized appreciation which accrues to corporate property after
1971.121 As a practical matter, however, they apparently believe that
the legislature would choose not to tax such income.2 No doubt any
legislative efforts toward imposing such a taxing policy would be
opposed by many of the same people who support Proposal 140.
Thus, in large measure the proponents of Proposal 140 argue the
equity of the issue. They state that it is a breach of faith for the state
to have induced the public to invest large sums of capital in the
state by promising an income tax prohibition, and then, in subse-
quent years, to reach back to tax the appreciation which accrued
118. The appendix accompanying appellee's brief to the Supreme Court of Florida in
Leadership Housing reproduces several 1924 news items which vigorously urged voter ap-
proval of the constitutional amendment banning income taxation. Brief of Appellees app.,
Department of Revenue v. Leadership Hous., Inc., 343 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1977).
119. Excerpts of Remarks by Martha Barnett, supra note 93 at 7.
120. Id. at 3.
121. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 216-17 (Jan. 24, 1978) (remarks of Ben Overton
and Kenneth Plante).
122. Department of Revenue v. Leadership Hous., Inc., 343 So. 2d at 613.
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while the ban on income taxation was in effect.' 2'
Although they acknowledge that the people of Florida had every
right to amend the constitution to remove the prohibition on the
taxation of corporate income, '4 proponents of the proposal imply
that without express constitutional authorization, the state is pro-
hibited from reaching back, after a post-1971 sale of corporate prop-
erty, to tax "income" which accrued prior to removal of the consti-
tutional ban on corporate income taxation.'12
The arguments against Proposal 140 also focus on the definition
of "income." Opponents of the proposal adopt the definition of the
term which the Supreme Court of the United States developed in
Eisner v. Macomber. ' Under the Court's definition, there is
"income" only when property is sold or otherwise disposed of and a
gain realized. Mere appreciation in property value is not "income"
for taxation purposes.'1 Thus, under the "realization doctrine,"
until a gain is realized through the sale or other disposition of prop-
erty, the property owner has merely an inchoate interest in the
unrealized appreciation.' 8
Opponents of the measure assert that any gain resulting from a
sale of corporate property becomes "income" only at the time of
sale, and, if the sale occurred after 1971, the gain is fully taxable. 12'
Since, in their view, mere appreciation in value is not "income,"
property not disposed of during the constitutional prohibition of
corporate income taxation is not protected from taxation.", The
opponents point to numerous federal and state cases in which the
courts have consistently held that increases in the value of property
are "income" in the year the gain is realized-not at the time it
123. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 231-34 (Jan. 24, 1978) (remarks of B.K. Rob-
erts).
124. Excerpts of Remarks by Martha Barnett, supra note 93, at 10.
125. This argument ignores the well-recognized view that state constitutions are limiting
documents rather than documents which grant powers. See 1 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION § 2.03, at 19-20 (1972). Absent a provision in either the state or federal
constitution limiting the state's inherent powers, a state may enact any law, without limita-
tion. Therefore, arguably at least, when the constitutional prohibition on corporate income
taxes was lifted, the legislature was free to define for itself the scope of the newly enacted
corporate tax. The prior constitutional limitation was no longer binding on the legislature.
126. 252 U.S. 189 (1919).
127. Id. at 207.
128. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 60, at 25.
129. One of these opponents, Justice Overton, who wrote the majority opinion in
Leadership Housing, served as a member of the Constitution Revision Commission. His
remarks during floor debate on Proposal 140 built upon the views he expressed in Leadership
Housing. See Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 216-20 (Jan. 24, 1978) (remarks of Ben
Overton).
130. Brief of Appellant, supra note 60, at 20, 23.
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accrues. 3' They also point to the intent section of the Florida In-
come Tax Code which specifically incorporates definitions applica-
ble to the Federal Income Tax Code. 32
In addition, Proposal 140's opponents argue that this is a legisla-
tive issue which does not merit elevation to constitutional status.'3
They direct attention to the language which the 1971 Florida Legis-
lature considered and rejected when enacting the corporate tax stat-
ute.'3' Had it been enacted into law, this language would have ex-
cluded from taxation all appreciation accruing prior to December
31, 1971. They argue that the supporters of Proposal 140 are at-
tempting to accomplish by constitutional amendment an alterna-
tive which the legislature considered and rejected in 1971.131 This
being the case, they state that the legislature is the proper forum
in which to amend laws or to nullify court opinions by enacting new
law.'3
It is interesting to note that the opponents of Proposal 140 do not
find it necessary, as do the proponents, to look to the popular intent
behind the 1924 constitutional ban on income taxation for their
interpretation of the term "income." In floor debate, however,
Chairman D'Alemberte presented an argument to counter the pro-
ponents' contention that taxing pre-November 2, 1971, accruals in
value is a breach of faith, emphasizing the doubt that existed prior
to 1971 about the scope of the constitutional ban.' 37
Unfortunately, after the popular vote in November, we still will
have no clear indication of the way in which voters perceived the
issues raised by Proposal 140. The corporate tax proposal will be
placed on the ballot in a grouping with eleven other finance and
131. See, e.g., MacLaughlin v. Alliance Ins. Co., 286 U.S. 244 (1932); Eisner v. Macomber,
252 U.S. 189 (1919); Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339 (1918); Fullerton Oil Co. v. Johnson, 39
P.2d 796 (Cal. 1934); Kellems v. Brown, 313 A.2d 53 (Conn. 1972); Norman v. Bradley, 160
S.E. 413 (Ga. 1931); City Nat'l Bank v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 102 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1960);
Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Reeves, 154 S.W.2d 337 (Ky. 1941); Olvey v. Collector of
Revenue, 99 So. 2d 317 (La. 1957); Tiedemann v. Johnson, 316 A.2d 359 (Me. 1974); Shangri-
La, Inc. v. State, 309 A.2d 285 (N.H. 1973); see Brown, supra note 55, at 4-5. Proponents
respond that case law from other jurisdictions is not on point since Florida is the only state
which constitutionally prohibited the taxation of income. See Horwich, supra note 27, at 38.
132. See Brown, supra note 55, at 2-3. FLA. STAT. § 220.02 (1977).
133. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 215, 239, 244, 246-48 (Jan. 24, 1978) (remarks
of Ben Overton, John DeGrove, and Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte).
134. Id. at 215, 230. See note 43 supra for the language considered and rejected by the
1971 Florida Legislature.
135. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 215, 230 (Jan. 24, 1978) (remarks of Ben Over-
ton).
136. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 244, 246-48 (Jan. 24, 1978) (remarks of John
DeGrove and Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte).
137. See text accompanying note 103 supra for remarks of Commissioner D'Alemberte.
DEFINING A FAIR SHARE
taxation measures, including a homestead exemption issue that
promises to generate much voter support.' Since the prior legisla-
tive and popular intent surrounding the corporate profits tax issue
is unclear, and the equitable and legal considerations are balanced,
it is unfortunate that voters will not have the opportunity to decide
the corporate tax issue separate and apart from the other taxation
proposals.
VII. CONCLUSION
This note has traced the constitutional, legislative, and judicial
history which served as the backdrop against which Proposal 140
was presented to the Florida Constitution Revision Commission.
The arguments for and against the proposal have been presented.
In November, Florida voters will be asked to make what is largely
a policy decision. They will decide whether the state will exempt
from taxation all appreciation accruing to corporate property while
the constitutional ban on corporate income taxation was in effect.
This decision will directly affect state revenues. A vote in favor of
the proposal would reduce the amount of corporate profits tax reve-
nue that will be collected in future years, although the extent of the
fiscal impact is uncertain. 31
A more subtle effect of the voters' decision will be an implicit
affirmation or rejection of the Florida Supreme Court's recent inter-
pretation of the term "income." 0 A vote against the corporate tax
proposal may be read as an affirmation of the court's view that
accrued gains on property are not "income" for taxation purposes
until the property is disposed of and the gain realized. Approval of
Proposal 140 would indicate implicit rejection of this definition of
"income" and implicit approval of a definition which views all ap-
preciation in value as "income" at the time it accrues. If Proposal
140 is approved, only time and the whims of future legislatures will
tell what effects, if any, a change in the concept of "income" will
have on Florida's tax structure.
138. See note 2 supra for the language of the proposal which will be presented to the
voters.
139. See note 95 supra.
140. Department of Revenue v. Leadership Hous., Inc., 343 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1977).
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